Journal of Human Security

The precariat is a new social category that exists in all countries around the world and consists of people who work in the gig economy and/or are employed under civil law contracts. One of the key factors that determines membership of the precariat is the uncertainty felt by individuals in the labour market as a result of, inter alia, being employed on flexible forms. The research aim of this article is to define the specificity of the Polish precariat and their sense of social security in the context of the current employment support and social policy of the Polish government. The utilitarian goal is to evaluate the “Polish Deal” programme currently proposed by the Polish government in terms of its strengths and weaknesses in order to reduce the precariat phenomenon and boost the Polish precariat’s sense of social security. The article also attempts to demonstrate the effects of actions taken by the Polish government since 2015, which were aimed at improving the situation on the precariat labour market.

In order to determine the extent to which the current government in Poland affects the social security of the precariat and satisfies their needs by taking social welfare action and implementing indirect operations related to education, a questionnaire was used, conducted via the Internet, involving a survey panel of respondents. In this study, a stratified-quota sample selection was used, corresponding to the proportions of people working on the basis of various flexible forms of fixed-term employment and self-employment.

One thousand respondents employed on flexible terms participated in the study. The study was carried out at the turn of March/April 2021.

Over the last five years, violent non-state actors have acquired armed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and have been using them extensively. This paper presents the main non-state actors involved and the areas in which they have used this tool, as well as how UAVs are used and procured. To date, armed UAVs have mainly been used by non-state actors in the Middle East and Central Asia. They have also been used in the conflict zones of Ukraine, Myanmar, Mexico, and Ecuador. While this is worrisome, limited evidence suggests that violent non-state actors use armed UAVs intentionally in areas where mostly civilians are present. The paper details the state of UAV usage by non-state actors and develops a thesis of cyclic adaptation between state and non-state actors. Not only do non-state actors learn from state actors, so does state and state-backed actors learn from non-state actors in conflict zones.

This process have been visible on the battlefield in Ukraine, where state-backed actors on both sides have incorporated smaller consumer style UAVs into their repertoire. As the use of armed UAVs developed substantially following Hezbollah’s early UAV operations in 2004 and spread to many regions of the world, the adaptation of non-state cleverness and ingenuity can be harnessed by state actors in times of poor or limited access to weaponry and support systems.

This article examines the construction of gender agendas in left-wing populist movements that mobilise for armed struggle, by focusing on the case of the Maoist movement in Nepal. Feminist scholarship has highlighted how left-wing populism, when appealing to a generalized “people”, tend to produce homogenizing discourses that erase inequalities and difference, even when such movements integrate a gender dimension. Examining the trajectory of the Maoist movement over time, we argue that this ‘sameness’ may become contested and utilized by women participating in the lower echelons of the movement, as the political reality shifts from conflict to post-conflict context. As our main contribution, we develop a bi-directional approach that employs the concept of collective identity and allows us to examine the construction of populist agendas as a two-way interaction between the leadership of a movement and its grass roots supporters. Through this approach we show how the gender dimension was not merely a bi-product but central to both the construction of the Maoist movement’s war time ‘progressive’ identity, and the fragmentation of this identity and the movement’s populist appeal in the post-conflict context.